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 This is an original petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus challenging the Nevada 
State Board of Equalization’s review and remand of the Washoe County Board of Equalization’s 
determination to equalize certain taxable valuations.   
   
Disposition/Outcome 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court held the State Board of Equalization (“State Board”) retained 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Washoe County Assessor (“Assessor”) in April 2007, 
even though the statutory deadline had expired, because the deadline is directory, meaning that it 
is advisory rather than compulsory.  However, the State Board has discretion to remand a matter 
to a county board only when the record before the State Board is inadequate because of “an act 
or omission of the county assessor, the district attorney or the county board of equalization.”2  
Thus, the Court held that the State Board arbitrarily remanded the matter to the County Board 
because there was sufficient evidence in the record for the State Board to review.  Accordingly, 
the Court granted Village League’s (the “Taxpayer’s”) petition for a writ of mandamus. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In 2002, the Assessor physically reappraised properties in Incline Village and Crystal 
Bay to determine their taxable values for the 2003-2004 tax year.  The reappraisals dramatically 
increased tax assessments for many taxpayers, and they began to question the methods used by 
the Assessor in developing the tax values.  For the 2006-2007 year, the year at issue in this case, 
the number of taxpayer challenges increased exponentially due, in part, to a district court 
decision originating from taxpayer challenges to the 2003-2004 assessments.3 
 In Bakst, 17 taxpayers challenged the methods used by the Assessor to appraise property 
for the 2003-2004 year.4  The County and State Boards upheld the valuations of the taxpayers’ 
properties; however, in January 2006, the district court issued a decision declaring the Assessor’s 
methods for creating the taxable values were unconstitutional, and therefore, void.5  The district 
court ordered the taxable values of the 17 properties be rolled back to the values of 2002-2003, 
which the taxpayers conceded were constitutional.  The Assessor and County appealed the 
decision.   
                                                 
1 By Kristopher Zeppenfeld 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.360 (6) (2007). 




 While the Bakst, appeal was pending; hundreds of taxpayers in the Incline Village and 
Crystal Bay areas challenged their property tax assessments for the 2006-2007 year, seeking 
rollbacks similar to the taxpayers in Bakst.  The County Board found that in approximately 300 
cases in 2006-2007, the Assessor had used the methodologies that the district court in Bakst had 
deemed unconstitutional.  The County Board therefore ordered the 300 properties’ taxable values 
be rolled back to the values for 2002-2003.   
 After the County Board decided those challenges, it had created an unequal rate of 
taxation for the 2006-2007 year.  Accordingly, the County Board made a general equalization 
decision, which is at issue in this petition.  Under its regulatory duty to “seek to equalize taxable 
valuation within…the whole county,”6 the County Board rolled back the taxable values for the 
approximately 8,700 other properties in the Incline Village and Crystal Bay areas.   
 The Assessor appealed the equalization decision to the State Board.  The State Board 
began its annual session for the 2006-2007 tax year on March 27,2006.  The State Board must 
decide all cases that will have a “substantial effect on tax revenues” on or before April 15 of each 
year,7 held a hearing to determine if any of the cases before it would have a substantial effect on 
tax revenues.  While the 300 individual cases and the generalization decision for the 8,700 cases 
would substantially effect revenue, the State Board did not hold its first hearing on the merits of 
the Assessor’s appeal until April 2007.  The State Board was advised to wait because the Court 
had yet to make its ruling on the Bakst appeal.  The Court made its ruling on Bakst in December 
2006, and in January 2007, the County Board issued its written equalization decision rolling back 
8,700 properties’ taxable values.   
 At the hearing, the State Board decided that, as appellant, the Assessor was a party and 
that all of the 8,700 taxpayers affected by the equalization decision were the respondents.  The 
State Board permitted Village League to argue on the 8,700 taxpayers’ behalf.  Village League 
asserted that the County Board had rolled back the 8,700 properties’ taxable values because the 
Assessor had used unconstitutional methods to develop the values.   
 The State Board concluded that the record contained insufficient evidence to enable it to 
consider the propriety of the County Board’s decision to roll back the taxable values.  The State 
Board remanded the case to the County Board so that it could further develop the record.  The 
Taxpayers, argue that the State Board has no jurisdiction to act on the Assessor’s appeal after 




 Here, the Court sat en banc and decided that because there is no adequate legal remedy 
available to the Taxpayers if the State Board’s remand was in error, it will consider a petition for 
extraordinary relief.  Moreover, the Court determined that the general equalization is an 
appealable action, the State Board did have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the State Board 





                                                 
6 NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.624 (2007). 
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I. General Equalization is an appealable action of the County Board  
 
 Here, the Court must determine whether the Assessor could appeal the County Board’s 
decision in the first instance.  Any taxpayer aggrieved at the action of the county board of 
equalization in equalizing, or failing to equalize, the value of his property, or property of others, 
or a county assessor, may file an appeal with the State Board of Equalization.8  Therefore, a 
taxpayer or an assessor may appeal a county board’s decision regarding a property’s taxable 
valuation to the State Board.9  Here, although the County Board’s decision was one of general 
equalization, it was an action of the County Board and therefore appealable to the State Board by 
the Assessor.   
 
II. The State Board had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the statutory deadlines 
for action by boards of equalization are directory 
 
 Two statutory deadlines establish dates by which the State Board is directed to complete 
its business.  Specifically, the State Board is to make decisions on matters substantially affecting 
tax revenues by April 15 of each year,10 and all other State Board business is to be completed by 
October 1 of each year.11   
 The Court’s analysis of the statutory deadlines centered on a determination of whether 
the deadlines are meant to be mandatory or directory.  This court has long held that when a 
statutory time limit is material, it should be construed as mandatory unless the Legislature 
intended otherwise.12  Furthermore, statutes creating time or manner restrictions are generally 
construed as mandatory.13  Moreover, the Taxpayers note that over 100 years ago, this court 
held, in State v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., that the then-existing statutory deadline for the 
State Board was mandatory.14  In contrast, statutes are typically considered directory, or advisory 
only, when they require performance within a reasonable time or provide specifically that 
substantial compliance is sufficient.15   
 Here, the court assessed the intent of the Legislature by looking to the language of the 
statute.  The court determined that the language of NRS 361.380(1) suggests that deadlines are 
mandatory.  However, the court looked to another statute that indicates that the Legislature 
intended NRS Chapter 361 deadlines to be permissive.16   
 Additionally, the court considered the implications of construing deadlines as mandatory 
or directory.  The court opined that construing the deadlines as mandatory would result in 
denying taxpayers the opportunity to challenge assessments, whereas construing deadlines as 
directory would allow the boards to hear all of the taxpayer appeals.  Furthermore, the court 
determined that it may construe a statute as directory to prevent “harsh, unfair or absurd 
                                                 
8 NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.360(1) (2007). 
9 Mineral County v. State, Board Equalization, 119 P.3d 706, 709 (Nev. 2005). 
10 NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.380(1) (2007). 
11 Id. 
12 Corbett v. Bradley, 7 Nev. 106,108 (1871). 
13 Leven v. Frey, 168 P.3d 712,718 (Nev. 2007). 
14 30 P. 693,694 (Nev. 1892). 
15 Leven, 168 P.3d at 718. 
16 NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.330 (2007). 
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consequences.”17  As a result, the court held that the Legislature intended the statutory deadlines 
for the State Board to be directory, and therefore, it overruled the prior holding in Central 
Pacific.  Accordingly, the court opined that the State Board retained jurisdiction to hear the 




III. The State Board arbitrarily remanded the County Board’s equalization decision 
 
 The State Board may remand a matter to a county board of equalization if the record is 
inadequate because of “an act or omission of the county assessor, the district attorney or the 
county board of equalization.”18  Thus, the State Board may remand a case to develop the record 
if one of the county actors caused the record to be insufficient for its review.   
 The County Board’s record contained detailed minutes of the meetings that the board had 
in determining whether or not to rollback the taxable values to the 8,700 properties.  
Furthermore, the record explicitly states that the County Board considered whether the 
Assessor’s calculations were unconstitutional in light of the Bakst holding.   
 The court concluded that the State Board’s remand order disregarded the record and 
reasoning of the County Board.  Furthermore, the court opined that the State Board had pointed 
to no act or omission rendering the record before it inadequate to consider the merits of the 
County Board’s equalization decision.  Therefore, the State Board arbitrarily exercised its 
discretion when it remanded this matter to the County Board, and the court determined that writ 




 The court denied the Taxpayer’s request for writ of certiorari, as the State Board did 
retain jurisdiction over the Assessor’s appeal; however, the court did grant the petition for a writ 
of mandamus, because the Taxpayers demonstrated that they are without adequate legal remedy 
and that the State Board arbitrarily exercised its discretion.  Thus, the court issued the writ 
instructing the State Board to vacate its remand order and proceed with its consideration of the 
Assessor’s appeal of the County Board’s equalization decision on the merits.   
 
                                                 
17 Leven, 168 P.3d at 717. 
18 NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.360 (6) (2007). 
